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Abstract
By using the classic works of Durkheim as a theoretical platform, this research explores the 
relationship between legal systems and social solidarity. We found that certain types of civil 
law system, most notably those of Scandinavia, are associated with higher levels of social capital 
and better welfare state provision. However, we found the relationship between legal system 
and societal outcomes is considerably more complex than suggested by currently fashionable 
economistic legal origin approaches, and more in line with the later writings of Durkheim, and, 
indeed, the literature on comparative capitalisms. Relative communitarianism was strongly 
affected by relative development, reflecting the complex relationship between institutions, state 
capabilities and informal social ties and networks.
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With a focus upon social solidarity, this comparative study elaborates Durkheim’s work 
on the relationship between the law and society and compares it to more recent work on 
the role of law. Specifically, we explore continuities in the relationship between legal 
tradition, collectivism and the relative depth and stability of welfare institutions. 
Defining social solidarity as ‘the feeling of reciprocal sympathy and responsibility 
among members of a group which promotes mutual support’, Wilde (2007: 171) has 
argued that the concept of solidarity has, until recently, only received relatively sporadic 
attention within the sociological discipline since Durkheim’s seminal work. Nevertheless, 
the issue seems to be of perceived importance, especially because it has been claimed 
that the increasing incursion of market relationships into social contexts, formerly 
ordered through a sense of social solidarity located in mutual social attachments and 
reciprocal obligations as a guide to appropriate behaviour, has exacerbated anomie (see 
e.g. Etzioni, 1996, 2004). In a different vein, Habermas recently has observed that ‘the 
tendencies towards a breakdown in solidarity in everyday life … in western civil socie-
ties’ had reduced the likelihood of the mobilization of a cohesive social movement for 
change (Habermas et al., 2010: 74). Moreover this apparent erosion of a sense of com-
munity, and the libertarian inclination to reduce society to an aggregation of individuals 
instrumentally joined for their own convenience, is often seen as the legacy of an unreg-
ulated free-market capitalism engendered by the hegemony of neoliberal policies 
(Cerny, 2008; Dardot and Laval, 2013; Etzioni, 1996: 156; Harvey, 2005) that are 
thought to be restructuring the global economy.
Despite variation according to historical and social context (see e.g. Foucault, 2008), 
it is widely thought that the key parameters of neoliberalism’s underlying normative 
rationality have demonstrated a remarkable adaptability and resilience, often in the face 
of evidential policy failure (see e.g. Dardot and Laval, 2013; Peck, 2010). As Dardot and 
Laval (2013: 1–4) observe, crucial differences between neoliberalism and classical liber-
alism help us understand those parameters. In particular, neoliberalism rejects classical 
liberalism’s naturalization of markets that justified the demand that the state must not 
intervene except to maintain private property rights. As Dardot and Laval indicate (2013: 
46–47), this passivity of classical liberalism contrasts sharply with neoliberal interven-
tionism which paradoxically emphasizes the role of the state in guaranteeing the opera-
tion of free markets (see also Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007; Peck, 2010). Such a role is 
essential for neoliberals since markets are deemed unnatural and have to be forcefully 
promoted through normative policy agendas which embrace the state itself within the 
logic of competition.
So, despite a range of guises, Peck (2010: 8–9) argues that the defining characteristic 
of neoliberalism is the capture and (re)use of the state to shape a freer market order, 
although how this is done has historically varied. In exploring this line of continuity he 
contrasts (Peck, 2010: 17–23) the ‘free-economy-and-minimalist-state’ of ‘roll-back’ 
Chicago-inspired neoliberalism with the ‘roll out … socially embedded market order’ 
liberalism that underpinned the development of the social market economy in post-war 
Germany that tried to work between ‘unfettered capitalism and state control’ (p. 60). As 
the literature on variegated capitalism alerts us, whilst neoliberalism has global ecosys-
temic dominance, its relative forms and consequences persistently vary between contexts 
(Jessop, 2012). Moreover, as Dardot and Laval (2013: 3–11) argue, drawing on Foucault’s 
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(2008: 131) earlier view, neoliberalism is a socially pervasive governmental rationality 
that inscribes non-market social and political domains with the ‘formal principles of 
market economy’ as a disciplinary regime: an extension of market rationality without 
precedence. This includes the articulation of self-entrepreneurial governance, through 
individual and collective internalization of competitive enterprise as an ‘existential 
norm’, where egoism is encouraged as an ontological necessity for competitive survival 
‘to the detriment of collective solidarities’ (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 3–11).
However, the claim that such differentiating and individualistic processes are the pre-
dominant feature of contemporary society may be undermined by the evident enduring 
popularity of the desire to belong (see Guibernau, 2013). Alternatively, these processes 
may articulate new (see Crow, 2002), sometimes relatively hidden, social bonds (Spencer 
and Pahl, 2006), which even when self-selected and individuated can realize collective 
concerns (Wilkinson, 2010: 467). Nevertheless, others take a somewhat less nuanced 
view, suggesting a general individualization of social life (see Etzioni, 2004; Putnam, 
1998). It is thought that this has been particularly evident in work organizations. Here, 
the decline of the corporatist consensus since the 1980s has been presented as a driving 
force behind broader processes of individualization (see Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 
2002). For example, it is thought that as part of an increasingly post-bureaucratic organi-
zational trajectory, there have been moves towards marketizing employer–employee 
relations under the auspices of neoliberal requirements to open organizations to free 
market discipline. Ironically, such developments are often couched in anti-hierarchical 
discourses that reversed critiques originally directed against capitalism per se into nor-
mative support (see Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007: 202). One result, it is claimed, has 
been the decay of workplace social relations, once often based upon mutuality and ‘tra-
ditional obligation’ (Hendry, 2001: 213; see also Vallas and Hill, 2012), to create more 
precarious and individualized employment relationships (Kalleberg, 2009) in the name 
of entrepreneurial governance and the entrepreneurialization of the self (see Dardot and 
Laval, 2013).
Such a view of the effects of neoliberalism, especially upon the workplace, echoes 
Durkheim’s (e.g. 1897 [1951]: 254–258) critique of Spencer’s version of utilitarianism. 
For Dardot and Laval (2013: 28–47), Spencer’s ‘biological evolutionism’ was a turning 
point in liberal doctrine which influenced later neoliberal ideas regarding the primacy of 
competition in social relations so as not to arrest evolution. Moreover, in a proto-neoliberal 
manner, Spencer saw the state’s remit was only ‘to guarantee the execution of freely 
agreed contracts’ (cited in Dardot and Laval, 2013: 31) as a precondition for free compe-
tition between private interests. For Durkheim, Spencer’s utilitarian norms would under-
mine social solidarity by unfettering egoism through failing to place normative limits 
upon aspirations and their efficacious pursuit (see also Chriss, 2010). Indeed, Durkheim 
believed that the division of labour was not merely an economic phenomenon but a key 
potential source of social solidarity (1893 [1964/1984]): hence contemporary develop-
ments in the workplace would be of significant concern to Durkheim due to their poten-
tial for exacerbating anomie. Indeed he argued (1893 [1964/1984]) that although 
individual autonomy was a necessary feature of the modern world, this needed to be 
balanced with organic social solidarities that tempered egoism with altruism, so as to 
preserve individual wellbeing and social coherence. At times Durkheim saw the law as a 
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‘key’ to understanding society, given its role in underwriting social solidarity but, at 
other times, he saw the law as only one of several defining institutions (see Cotterrell, 
1999). Throughout, however, he remained convinced that certain legal traditions, above 
all French civil law, were relatively effective in promoting social ties.
The research reported here seeks to explore the extent to which the law and, more 
specifically, legal origin impacts on social solidarity using a panel of developed and 
developing nations over several years. We first introduce Durkheim’s understanding of 
institutions and the law and how he saw it as the ‘key’ indicator of underlying modes of 
social solidarity. We then highlight key differences between Durkheim and the main 
alternative contemporary ways of conceptualizing institutions, and their respective rele-
vance for understanding differences encountered in social solidarities between different 
national locales. Next, we consider different types of legal system and their relationship 
to different expressions of social solidarity. Specifically, we compare legal origin to 
social capital, social protection, and the relative extent of communitarianism: ‘mecha-
nisms of solidarity’ that have been attacked by neoliberals as sources of individual irre-
sponsibility and systemic inefficiencies (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 164–165). We proceed 
to explore the degree to which, given the decline of welfare institutions in many national 
economies, the effects of the law are becoming less pronounced. Finally, we draw out the 
implications of this study.
Durkheim: Social Solidarity and Legal Systems
For Durkheim, social solidarity is about shared commitments to social practices; social 
regulation is direct and externalized control over such practices is via law and custom 
(Adair, 2008: 106). Durkheim saw legal regulation as a key to the maintenance of social 
solidarity, whilst being an expression and indicator of differences in underlying moral 
sentiments and forms of social solidarity (see also Prosser, 2006). However, he held that 
the complexity of social relationships and solidarities is proportional to the number of 
promulgated legal rules. Durkheim’s views were shaped by the role of continental civil 
law systems – especially French law – that place an emphasis on promoting social cohe-
sion (1893 [1964/1984]: 371). Therefore, Durkheim believed that the quality of law 
could provide an index of social solidarity: it is one manifestation of the degree of social 
solidarity encountered within a society as well as being, for some, an explanation of 
variations in solidarity (Prosser, 2006: 371–380). For example, Durkheim thought that 
inequality could be superseded by social solidarity through legal mediation: this funda-
mentally reflects the civil rather than the common law tradition (see Cotterrell, 1999).
Durkheim (1893 [1964/1984]; cf. Cotterrell, 1999: 33) saw law as central to under-
standing society, arguing that law also constituted an externalized manifestation of social 
solidarity. Therefore one needed to classify the law to better understand and categorize 
the underlying, associated, social solidarity. Durkheim further argued that the law in 
itself is also a manifestation of the evolution of social solidarity and moral sentiments 
and non-legal societal features (e.g. occupational groups and professional associations) 
could also have a strong effect. Moreover, compromises between different interests were 
possible and were indeed desirable in pluralistic, industrialized societies with increas-
ingly complex divisions of labour (see Durkheim, 1957: 13–17). This would suggest that 
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whilst legal origin exerts a long term effect, the actual effect of the law would change 
over the years, due to non-legal societal dynamics and, indeed, the extent to which the 
latter might feed into legislation. However, it has been argued that common law systems 
generally favour a particular social grouping, property owners, and accord them priority 
over other interests in society; a civil law system in contrast seeks to promote social soli-
darity, and ‘reflects organic solidarity’ (Hart, 1967: 1).
Civil and Common Law
There is in the literature a key distinction between civil law and common law contexts 
(cf. Hart, 1967). In common law systems, much of the law is made by judges, and tends 
to focus on protecting individual rights and liberties. In contrast, civil law, on which 
Durkheim focused, tends to have more comprehensive legislation than is usual in com-
mon law countries. Here, the constitution and the legislation are more important and, 
it can be argued, in order to be durable, this tends to necessitate social compromise. 
Hence civil law, according to Durkheim (1893 [1964/1984]), aims to promote social 
inclusion. Indeed, the emphasis on solidarity in certain continental European (civil 
law) state traditions aimed to overcome class antagonisms through a commitment to 
universal social progress.
To Durkheim, social solidarity could represent the natural consequence of an advanced 
division of labour. Indeed he initially thought that anomie was unnatural and transient 
(1893 [1964/1984]: 377) and that an organic solidarity would inevitably develop that 
would support the interdependencies that were the product of an increasingly complex 
division of labour. However, his later work was pessimistic about this social trajectory 
since he thought that the increasingly forced division of labour and the diaspora of 
Utilitarian norms would produce dangerous tensions by exacerbating economic egoism 
even whilst simultaneously increasing mutual interdependencies (see e.g. Durkheim, 
1928 [1962]). To ameliorate this problem he saw the need to develop a ‘freely willed’ 
collective conscience (1925 [1961]: 120) that balanced individual autonomy with collec-
tive co-operation (see also Pearce, 2001: 155). For Durkheim (1893 [1964/1984]: 25) 
these norms could be disseminated by democratically constituted ‘occupational groups’ 
who, like their medieval guild forerunners, would socialize members into accepting 
moral obligations to others as a basis of economic activity, thereby constraining eco-
nomic egoism by a countervailing altruism and promoting an ‘unforced’ division of 
labour (1893 [1964/1984]: 376).
In reaction to earlier work that sought to depict him as a conservative figure who 
never changed his basic ideas (although his interests shifted from economics to the role 
of religion in societies) (Nisbet, 1967), an influential body of more recent Durkheim 
studies sought not only to draw out the more challenging (indeed, as Lukes, 1973, argues, 
radical) elements of his work, but also divide the latter into early and late periods on 
rather different lines (Fournier, 2005). The former is depicted as ‘materialistic and deter-
minist’ and the latter as ‘more idealistic and benevolent’ (Fournier, 2005: 43–44). This 
led to much debate as to how more precisely such periods might be delineated. Critics 
such as Giddens (1971) have argued for a more precise approach, clearly delineating the 
contribution in specific works. Fournier (2005) suggests that there was, in fact, a period 
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of transition, when Durkheim began to accord greater attention to ideas and religion in 
social life, making it difficult to clearly delineate early and late stages, which, in any 
event, only corresponded with a few years’ gap. Perhaps a key delineator is the relative 
attention in different works that Durkheim accorded to seeking to reconcile individual-
ism and social solidarity (cf. Greenhouse, 2011); he was a profoundly political thinker, 
with a deep interest in the role of the power and the state within this nexus, and alert to 
the dangers of economic liberalism in the absence of societal mediation (Fournier, 2005: 
48; Joas, 1993). Indeed, Durkheim recognized that in certain legal contexts moves to 
organic solidarity would prove difficult. Within a common law framework that prior-
itizes private property, abnormalities could arise, in the form of inequality and conflict: 
a forced division of labour that engenders anomie and undermines social solidarity 
(Wilde, 2007: 173), ultimately antithetical to growth. Therefore, as Wilde (2007: 175) 
notes, common law may promote individual inclusion but it undermines social inclusion 
owing to the ‘huge disparities flowing from the market system’ it supports.
More recently, there has been a revival in investigating the effects of legal systems 
on economy and society, but from a very different starting point to that of Durkheim. 
For example, La Porta et al. (1999, 2002; Botero et al., 2004) are within the main-
stream economic tradition that construes institutions as mechanisms that primarily 
enable or constrain the rational choices of profit-maximizing actors. They argue (e.g. 
1999) that common law systems are orientated towards protecting property owner 
rights, whilst civil law systems are mediated by other social interests; they see a zero 
sum trade-off between property owner rights and economic growth on the one hand, 
and employee rights and welfare provision on the other. Moreover, La Porta et al. 
(1999) suggest that legal origin over-codes (through its role in securing private prop-
erty rights) all other institutional features. However, in common with Durkheim, they 
suggest that civil law favours the interests of a broad cross-section of stakeholders, as 
opposed to assigning a particular social grouping primacy (La Porta et al., 1999; see 
also Baxi, 1973; Hart, 1967).
Above all, although united in their view as to the importance of the law and the state, 
what sets Durkheim apart from the contemporary work of La Porta and colleagues, is 
that whilst the latter see the law as beneficially diluting social restraint, Durkheim viewed 
the potential of the law in precisely opposite terms. Society is not simply about rights, 
but also about obligations. What did, however, shift in Durkheim’s work was away from 
a mistrust of mass action towards a more inclusive kind of corporatism (Fournier, 2005).
The Law and Social Solidarity: Key Concepts and 
Hypotheses
Social solidarity is a complex phenomenon that encompasses many different dimen-
sions, making the testing of the relationship between the law and social solidarity prob-
lematic. Hence, we explore the relationship between the law and different sub-dimensions 
or expressions of social solidarity. The civil law tradition is itself a diverse and complex 
one. Durkheim (1893 [1964/1984]) held that French legal tradition countries represented 
the epitome of civil law. Other categories of civil law would include German and 
Scandinavian law, where property rights are not as weak and collective rights as strong 
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as in French law, but are weaker than in common law systems (La Porta et al., 1999). As 
Cotterrell (1999) observes, Durkheim would have had little problem with an emphasis on 
the differences between common and civil law traditions, given his concern with social 
solidarity. Moreover, it seems likely that countries with common law traditions would be 
more receptive to neoliberal governance, given that judge-made law appears to be more 
responsive to the needs of property owners than civil law legislation (La Porta et al., 
1999). There has been a proliferation of theoretically eclectic theories rooted within the 
broad socio-economic tradition that aim to combine a range of institutional features into 
defined country categories (Amable, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999). 
Although these authors are discussing a much wider range of institutions, the liberal 
market economy (LME) category common to all these analyses largely mirrors the com-
mon law category discussed here (the only exceptions would be the hybrid legal systems 
of Scotland and Quebec, despite their location within LMEs).
A first requirement in turning this discussion into testable propositions is to define our 
terms. It is thought that there are numerous ways in which social solidarity may be articu-
lated and hence measured (Allik and Realo, 2004; Kushner and Sterk, 2005). One would 
be manifested through social capital, that is, the depth of the network between individu-
als that makes social life possible and underpins economic growth (Hollaway, 2008: 7). 
This argument draws heavily on Durkheim’s work and suggests that social capital reflects 
trust, reciprocity, civil engagement and community networks (Allik and Realo, 2004; 
Kushner and Sterk, 2005). Whilst it could be argued that social capital encompasses 
numerous other things as well, such as cultural, economic and human capital (Carpiano 
and Kelly, 2005), overall we follow the tenor of the debate and suggest that, as an expres-
sion of social solidarity, social capital will be higher in civil law states, hence:
H1: Civil law countries have higher levels of social capital than common law ones.
Durkheim (1893 [1964/1984]; and see Cladis, 1992: 2) held that there are two positions 
against which moral theories may be grouped: individualistic liberalism and communi-
tarianism. As we have already indicated, central to Durkheim’s theory of society was a 
conviction of the need to reconcile individual rights and freedoms with both social soli-
darity and a commitment to the collective wellbeing: in other words, both social ties and 
a shared agenda (see also Etzioni, 1996). So communitarianism both represents social 
solidarities that would act as a bulwark against anomie (Cladis, 1992: 2) and sets an 
agenda for social and institutional change (see also Tam, 1998) by promoting the condi-
tions necessary for the development of organic solidarity. Therefore:
H2: Civil law countries are likely to be more communitarian than common law 
ones.
An alternative indicator of social solidarity is the existence and coverage of welfare 
institutions (Baldwin, 1990). Where encompassing, these signal a willingness to treat all 
citizens fairly, through ‘reapportioning the costs of risks and mischance’, so that the 
vulnerable do not bear a disproportionate burden, and the more fortunate share out the 
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costs of events that do not immediately concern them (Baldwin, 1990: 1). Risks are 
pooled, with individuals benefitting from membership of a larger group; society shares 
out the costs, recognizing both the principle of equity and social solidarity as ‘terms of 
citizenship’ (Baldwin, 1990: 2). Hence, the welfare state enhances social cohesion and 
solidarity (Plant et al., 2009; Schmitt, 2000). In other words, rather than relying on 
chance, the rules and benefits of association are strengthened (Baldwin, 1990: 2). Hence, 
the welfare state provides social checks and balances, mediating tensions within and 
between groups (Palumbo and Scott, 2003: 379). Therefore:
H3: Civil law countries have a stronger welfare state.
Durkheim, who held that non-legal societal elements may also impact on social solidari-
ties and, indeed, so might legislation over time (Durkheim, 1957: 13–17), would have 
recognized these analyses, although other accounts, such as La Porta et al. (1999), would 
see legal origin as not easily subject to change. Beyond the legal environment, the 1990s 
and 2000s have seen strong pressures to liberalization, which may have eroded collective 
solidarities. Jessop (2012) argues that although individual national economies retain dis-
tinct institutional features, neoliberalism has attained global ecosystemic dominance, 
eroding national level ties, relations and solidarities. This is a process that has been 
underway since the 1980s, but has intensified in the 2000s. Hence:
H4: The relative strength of the welfare state has declined in civil law countries since 
1990, and the relative gap with common law countries has narrowed.
Methodology
Measures
The basis for testing the hypotheses outlined above revolves around the cross-country 
differences between the different measures of social solidarity and the legal origins of the 
countries within the analysis. As highlighted in the discussion above, social solidarity is 
a very complex relationship involving numerous factors, consequently producing a sin-
gle definitive measure of social solidarity would be very difficult. Since social solidarity 
equates to sympathy for, and commitment to, fellow citizens, it would be plausible to 
establish a measure of this via primary data at the individual level, but this would become 
considerably more challenging when making comparisons at the societal level, as is 
being undertaken here. However, as the hypotheses developed in the previous section 
identify specific areas of activity, as in effect proxies for different aspects of social soli-
darity, those precise proxies are used in the empirical analysis. The measures used for 
social solidarity are as are discussed below.
First, social capital is measured using Inglehart’s (1997) social capital index based 
upon organizational memberships. Second, at the level of societal culture, we measure 
the relative extent of communitarianism using the individualism/collectivism continuum 
developed by Diener et al. (2000).
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There are two measures reflecting the strength of the welfare state. First, total social 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP in 2009, taken from OECD 2012, is used as an absolute 
measure of the size of the welfare state. Then we need a measure of change, so we assess 
changes in social expenditure as a proportion of GDP between the years 1990 and 2009. 
This is used as a measure of the country’s strengthening, or otherwise, commitment to the 
welfare state over this period. The starting point 1990 was chosen since this resulted in the 
longest period giving coverage to the majority of the countries included in the analysis.
Categorizing Countries
To test these hypotheses we need to examine countries that provide a basis of comparison 
not only between common and civil law, but also between the different legal families 
within the latter: pure French civil law, and the German and Scandinavian legal traditions. 
There is much debate around the latter Scandinavian legal traditions. Some writers, such 
as La Porta et al. (1999) have suggested that they are hybrid and incorporate both civil and 
common law features, bringing them closer to the latter. However, Siems and Deakin 
(2009) suggest that it is overly simplistic to categorize them as weakened civil law sys-
tems. Indeed they argue that Scandinavian legal origin in particular appears to be more 
effective than classic French legal origin in realizing the solidarity ideals of civil law.
It is potentially plausible that alternative factors at the national level explain differ-
ences in social cohesion. Esping-Anderson (1990), with his classification of countries as 
Liberal, Corporatist-Statist or Social Democratic based on an index of decommodifica-
tion, offers the closest alternative. However, as argued by O’Connell (1991), it is histori-
cal legacy and institutional structure that mainly determine the positioning within the 
index: implying that legal tradition would play a key role in explaining both the extent of 
decommodification and level of social cohesion, hence it is the correct country classifi-
cation to be applied to this analysis. In terms of legal origin, a key distinction is whether 
law is judge-made (that is broad brush legislation, fleshed out by case law, that is court 
decisions), or civil law (more explicit legislation, vesting legislatures, and, by extension, 
interest groupings with more direct say) (Plucknett, 2010; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The latter, in turn, may be divided up into classic French civil law and German and 
Scandinavian variations.
In order to make the analysis as robust as possible the widest range of countries is 
included in the study, given the constraints of the measures outlined previously. In simple 
terms any country that fits into the categorization of legal origin, and where data is avail-
able for at least one of the measures, has been included in the analysis. For social capital 
and individualism-collectivism the measures are largely static, hence the analysis and 
findings are not sensitive to the time period. Whereas the strength of the welfare state is 
likely to display more variation over time and the findings will be more sensitive to the 
time period considered. Therefore data from 2009 are used as indicative of the strength 
of the welfare state since this is the final year before increased pressure from the ongoing 
global recession started to really cut into social expenditure. Finally, for the analysis of 
changes to the relative strength of the welfare state over time, 1990 is chosen as the start 
point as this is when OECD data become available for a large number of countries and 
enables the largest cross-section of countries to be used in the analysis.
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Analysis
The empirical analysis is then undertaken by highlighting similarities between each of 
the four measures of social solidarity and the legal origins of the countries included in the 
study. A total of 27 countries are used in the analysis, with these being countries where 
data is available for at least one of the four social solidarity measures. The values of each 
of the four measures of social solidarity for all of the countries are reported in Table 1.
Cluster analysis is applied to present a clearer picture as to the patterns within groups 
of countries sharing the same legal origins. The basis of cluster analysis is to group 
observations so that those within the group display greater similarity with each other 
than those in the other groups. Agglomerative hierarchical clustering is applied using the 
Euclidean distances between observations.
Findings
Hierarchical cluster analysis is applied for all four measures of social solidarity and the 
results are reported in Table 2. In each case the clusters are numbered from the lowest 
values in that category to the highest, i.e. for social capital those in cluster 1 have the 
lowest levels of social capital and those in cluster 4 the highest. In addition, box plots 
for each of the measures are reported separately, with the box plot for social capital 
shown in Figure 1.
On an observational level it is clear that higher levels of social capital are typically 
present in the Scandinavian1 countries, whilst lower levels are typically displayed within 
the French origin legal systems in the Mediterranean countries. More specifically, look-
ing at the cluster analysis (Table 2, column 3), Japan, Spain and the Netherlands are 
outliers in comparison to the other countries, with the former two forming the lowest 
cluster and the latter the highest. This leaves all the remaining countries grouped within 
the remaining 2 clusters, with the Scandinavian countries exclusively placed within the 
highest of these. For the French and German origin countries, with the exception of the 
outliers, they are exclusively placed within the lowest of the remaining clusters. Finally 
the common law countries straddle the two clusters and the distinction is a North 
American/European one with the USA and Canada having higher levels of social capital 
than the UK and Ireland.
Turning to the formal hypothesis outlined above, Hypothesis 1 predicts that social 
capital levels will be higher in civil law countries and this cannot be accepted in its 
entirety. It is clear that social capital is higher in the Scandinavian countries but that is 
certainly not the case for French and German origin countries.
In relation to individualism/collectivism (see Figure 2 and Table 2, column 4), the 
most individualist countries are found among the common law, Scandinavian and French 
origin countries whilst the most collectivist are typically among the common law and 
French developing countries. This distinction is confirmed by the cluster analysis where, 
almost exclusively, the developed nations are grouped within the more individualist clus-
ters whilst the developing nations are within the more collectivist groups. Hence, it 
would appear that individualism/collectivism is more strongly influenced by the level of 
development than by legal origin. The only real exception to this is South Korea, which 
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on many measures is no longer classified as a developing country, even though it is clear 
that this stage of development was achieved much later than any of the other countries 
included here. Clearly the implication from this is that Hypothesis 2 cannot be accepted 
since there is no real evidence that civil law countries are more communitarian than the 
common law ones.
The third hypothesis posits that civil law countries will have a stronger welfare state 
and, as far as a greater financial commitment equates to a stronger welfare state, we can 
explore this by examining Figure 3 and Table 2, column 5. It is noticeable that the lowest 
social expenditure as a proportion of GDP is amongst the developing countries; hence it 
may be the case that the strength of the welfare state is more strongly influenced by stage 
of development rather than legal origin. Beyond that, for the remaining countries, it is 
clear from both the box plot and the cluster analysis that the financial commitment to 
social expenditure is greater in Scandinavian and French origin countries than it is in 
Table 1. Measures of social solidarity.
Country Legal origin Social capital Individualism/
collectivism
Social 
expenditure
Change in social 
expenditure
Canada Common Law 170 8.50 19 0.05
Ireland Common Law 93 6.00 24 0.32
UK Common Law 116 8.95 24 0.37
USA Common Law 185 9.55 19 0.28
India Common Law Dev 4.40  
Nigeria Common Law Dev 3.00  
South Africa Common Law Dev 5.70  
Belgium French 145 7.25 30 0.24
France French 75 7.05 32 0.35
Netherlands French 242 8.50 23 –0.12
Argentina French Dev 93 4.80  
Brazil French Dev 85 3.90  
Chile French Dev 81 4.15 11 0.07
Mexico French Dev 93 4.00 8 0.24
Turkey French Dev 3.85 13 0.36
Italy French Med 77 6.80 28 0.40
Portugal French Med 68 7.05 26 0.66
Spain French Med 15 5.55 26 0.31
Austria German 112 6.75 29 0.27
Germany German 135 7.35 27 0.27
Japan German 20 4.30 22 0.55
South Korea German 145 2.40 10 0.34
Switzerland German 95 7.90 20 0.34
Denmark Scandinavian 175 7.70 30 0.25
Finland Scandinavian 175 7.15 29 0.26
Norway Scandinavian 188 6.90 23 0.05
Sweden Scandinavian 205 7.55 30 –0.02
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common law countries. However, this cannot be said to be the case for the German 
origin countries. As a result Hypothesis 3 can be partially accepted but only for the 
French origin and Scandinavian countries. However, it must be pointed out that this 
measure of welfare state strength reveals nothing about an individual’s personal experi-
ence of welfare state support and this is likely to vary significantly within each country. 
Governments regularly make decisions influencing the extent of welfare support for 
different groups within the economy; a process heightened in recent times by conflict-
ing pressures from ageing populations combined with the need to reduce public expend-
iture, leading to a changing balance of welfare support between the young and old. 
Unfortunately analysis of this process is beyond the scope of this study and will have to 
be flagged up for future research.
Hypothesis 4 implies that social expenditure as a proportion of GDP will have risen 
at a slower rate in civil law countries than in common law ones, which can then be 
Table 2. Cluster analysis results.
Country Legal origin Social capital Individualism/
collectivism
Social 
expenditure
Change in social 
expenditure
Canada Common Law 3 4 2 2
Ireland Common Law 2 3 3 3
UK Common Law 2 4 3 3
USA Common Law 3 4 2 3
India Common Law Dev 2  
Nigeria Common Law Dev 1  
South Africa Common Law Dev 3  
Belgium French 2 3 4 3
France French 2 3 4 3
Netherlands French 4 4 3 1
Argentina French Dev 2 2  
Brazil French Dev 2 2  
Chile French Dev 2 2 1 2
Mexico French Dev 2 2 1 3
Turkey French Dev 2 1 3
Italy French Med 2 3 3 3
Portugal French Med 2 3 3 4
Spain French Med 1 3 3 3
Austria German 2 3 4 3
Germany German 2 3 3 3
Japan German 1 2 3 4
South Korea German 2 1 1 3
Switzerland German 2 3 2 3
Denmark Scandinavian 3 3 4 3
Finland Scandinavian 3 3 4 3
Norway Scandinavian 3 3 3 2
Sweden Scandinavian 3 3 4 2
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Figure 1. Social capital box plot.
Figure 2. Individualism/collectivism box plot.
Johnson et al. 659
interpreted as a reduction in the relative strength of the welfare state. The evidence from 
both the box plot (Figure 4) and the cluster analysis (Table 2, column 6) does not concur 
with this. With the exception of the French civil law countries there is no clear pattern 
based around legal origin that can be detected: Hypothesis 4 has to be rejected.
Hence, the links between legal origin and social solidarity are somewhat uneven. 
There is some evidence to support the view that legal origin impacts upon social solidar-
ity, but the relationship is more nuanced than a simple civil law/common law dichotomy. 
Equally, factors beyond legal origin may be at least as important in terms of influence 
upon social solidarity as law. What we have found is in line with the qualifications 
Durkheim introduced in his later work and, indeed, the contemporary literature on com-
parative capitalisms (Amable, 2003; Fournier, 2005; Hall and Soskice, 2001): assem-
blies of institutions and associated social relations mediate competing interests and 
facilitating beneficial outcomes. However, it is at odds with writers such as La Porta 
et al. (1999) who suggest legal origin over-codes (through its role in securing private 
property rights) all other institutional features.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study revealed that whilst legal system appears to be related to a range of societal 
features, the relationship is a complex one, as suggested by Durkheim in his later works. 
Figure 3. Social expenditure as a proportion of GDP box plot.
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It also highlights the limitations of currently fashionable legal origins approaches in the 
economic and finance literatures, which suggest that legal origin has broad and universal 
explanatory power as to property owner rights, employee and stakeholder countervailing 
power, and social welfare (Djankov et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1999).
First, social capital was higher in Scandinavia than countries operating under different 
legal origins. This would suggest that Scandinavian societies have features that cannot 
simply be ascribed to dilute or allegedly hybrid legal origins (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Either the law in Scandinavia has very distinct effects to other legal families, or the law 
in Scandinavia works in concert with a broader range of institutional features in such a 
manner as to reinforce higher levels of social capital; as we noted earlier this is a possi-
bility suggested by Durkheim (cf. Fournier, 2005).
Second, we found no evidence that civil law was an effective mechanism for promot-
ing greater communitarianism. Rather, relative communitarianism appeared to be a func-
tion of relative development, with emerging markets recording higher levels of 
communitarian values than mature ones. Again, this would suggest that whilst, as we 
have seen, the law clearly impacts on a number of societal features, relative communi-
tarianism is strongly affected by relative development. However, communitarianism 
encompasses both a commitment to the common good (which can include the modern 
welfare state), and traditional norms and values, although there is, in turn, a tension 
between the two. In other words, communitarianism encompasses both social solidarities 
Figure 4. Change in social expenditure as a proportion of GDP box plot.
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and a shared agenda: the latter may be forward looking or look backwards to the values 
and conventions of the past (Lasch, 1986: 60). This may explain why relative commu-
nitarianism is not aligned to any single aspect of institutional arrangements in the 
developed world.
Moreover, ‘participationist’ approaches suggest that relative communitarianism rep-
resents a product of the degree of complexity and differentiation of institutional arrange-
ments (Benhabib, 1997: 51). Invariably, tensions and contradictions between different 
realms (e.g. economy, politics, family) mean that the possibility of agency is uneven; 
hence, even if specific national legal systems may be helpful in promoting specific 
aspects of social solidarity, they are, again, unlikely to be perfectly aligned with other 
institutions, with any gains in promoting ties in one area being eroded through institu-
tional shortcomings elsewhere (see Benhabib, 1997: 49–52).
Legal origin does seem to be related to the relative development of welfare institu-
tions, once the relative development of nations is taken into account. Scandinavian 
legal origin societies were the strongest in terms of welfare institutions, followed by 
France. This would again suggest that there is more to the Scandinavian legal system 
– and the assembly of social institutions around it – than simply a dilution of the 
French civil law system. In turn, French civil law systems were associated with supe-
rior welfare coverage to that provided by common law ones. But, by the same meas-
ure, more developed nations provided better welfare provision than emerging ones. 
This would serve to highlight the extent to which it is not just the design of institu-
tions but their evolution and the changing nature of inter-institutional linkages and 
support that determines societal outcomes. Again, this would echo the later work of 
Durkheim, where more attention was accorded to development and the relative fluid-
ity of societal arrangements.
Finally, we found that whilst the relative development of societies did matter, certain 
societal features were quite durable. For example, we found that there was not a signifi-
cant decline in the amount of resources devoted to the generally stronger welfare state of 
civil law countries versus common law ones. In other words, differences between com-
mon and civil law systems in this area were not significantly eroding over time. This 
would suggest that, pressures to liberalize notwithstanding, the welfare state in civil law 
systems appears somewhat more durable than is often presumed. This might reflect the 
strong ‘buy-in’ of the electorate to key aspects of welfare institutions: even if ecosys-
temically dominant, neoliberalism has not succeeded in erasing national institutional 
traditions or associated social practices. In other words, institutional arrangements 
underpinning a key dimension of social solidarity may be quite durable, in part reflecting 
the dualist nature between social structures and action (Giddens, 1971; Hall and Soskice, 
2001). However, it is possible that this may in part reflect further declines in the already 
more limited welfare provision encountered in common law systems. We cannot of 
course say whether the attacks on the welfare state following the global economic crisis 
that began in 2008 might not have changed this pattern.
As predicted by Durkheim, legal origin does seem to be associated with a range of 
societal features ranging from welfare coverage to social capital. However, the relation-
ship is a complex one, with institutional effects also being bound up with relative devel-
opment. For example, developing economies were significantly more communitarian 
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than developed ones, possibly reflecting the stronger role of tradition and associated 
values in underpinning communitarian values in such countries. It could be argued that 
communitarianism encompasses forward and traditionalist elements, the latter diluting 
any possible effects of differences brought about through legal systems, especially in the 
developing world. Scandinavian civil law countries still recorded higher levels of com-
munitarianism than other advanced societies, highlighting the impact of the law when 
traditionalism’s role is diminished.
We found a relationship between legal system and the strength of welfare institu-
tions, with individuals being more willing to pool risk, the latter a key dimension of 
social solidarity in Scandinavian and French civil law countries. Whilst institutional 
arrangements may provide the foundation for different growth trajectories, clearly a 
particular institutional recipe does not result in uniform societal outcomes regardless 
of relative state of development; it is not only formal institutional arrangements that 
matter, but also relative state capabilities and the operation and impact of informal 
social networks.
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Note
1. Strictly speaking, since our measures for ‘Scandinavian’ countries include Finland, we should 
rename this category ‘Nordic’ but we have continued to use the term ‘Scandinavian’ to stay 
close to the literature.
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